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NOTES
PROFIT RIGHTS AND CREDITORS' PRIORITIES AFTER
A PARTNER'S DEATH OR RETIREMENT:
SECTION 42 OF THE UPA*
RETIRIG partners or representatives of deceased partners often claim a
share of profits from business subsequently undertaken by remaining members
of the firm.' When a personal representative or a former partner has con-
sented informally or by assignment, partnership agreement, or will to leave
his investment in the business,2 he generally has the option of sharing in
*Blut v. Katz, 13 N.J. 374, 99 A.2d 785 (1953).
L Any retirement of a partner from a general partnership without violation of the
partnership agreement dissolves the partnership. See, e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 83 Cal. App.
2d 357, 188 P2d 802 (1948) (consent of all partners) ; Murray v. Bateman, 315 Mass.
113, 51 N.E2d 954 (1943) (terminable at will partnership); Ludlum v. Wagner, 212
App. Div. 779, 209 N.Y. Supp. 540 (3d Dep't 1925) (same); Uxnrom PA=,nmsuw Acr§ 31(1) (1949) (hereinafter cited as UPA).
Moreover, it is generally held that a withdrawal, even though in contravention of
the partnership agreement, will dissolve the partnership. See, e.g., Atha v. Atha, 303
Mich. 611, 6 N.W.2d 897 (1942); Solomon v. Kirkwood, 55 Mich. 256, 21 N.W. 336
(1884); UPA § 31(2). However, the partner wrongfully causing dissolution is liable
for damages for breach of contract. Burnstine v. Geist, 257 App. Div. 792, 15 N.Y.S2d
48 (1st Dept 1939) ; UPA § 38(2) (a) (II). This note does not primarily deal with the
problem of a wrongfully dissolved partnership.
A partner's death also dissolves a general partnership. E.g., Darcy v. Int. Rev.
Comm'r, 66 F2d 581 (2d Cir. 1933); Harmon v. Martin, 395 Ill. 595, 71 N.E2d 74(1947) ; UPA § 31(4) ; CR , PRTNmnsmap 405-07 (1952).
Dissolution requires the remaining partners to wind up partnership affairs, unless
there has been effective consent by the former partner or his personal representative to
continuation of the business. E.g., Mellon v. Heiner, 14 F. Supp. 424 (W.D. Pa. 1936) ;
Mosher v. Lount, 29 Ariz. 267, 240 Pac. 1027 (1925); Dial v. Martin, 37 S.W2d 166(Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; UPA § 38(1). "Winding up" refers to the liquidation of partner-
ship assets, the payment of partnership debts, and the distribution to partners of the cash
value of their partnership interests. See UPA §29, Commissioner's Note; Cnur, PA=er-
xsHcp 429 (1952).
2. See Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U.S. 613 (1881) (informally) ; Adams & Co. v. Albert,
155 N.Y. 356, 49 N.E. 929 (1898) (same); In re Rudy, 25 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ky.
1939) (assignment) ; In re Hess, 1 F.2d 342 (W.D. Pa. 1923) (same).
The partnership agreement may provide that the remaining partners shall purchase,
or Ihave an option to purchase, the interest of the deceased or retired partner. See Murphy
v. Murphy, 217 Mass. 233, 104 N.E. 466 (1914) ; cf. McKinnon v. McKinnon, .56 Fed. 4G9
(Sth Cir. 1893); Harbster's Appeal, 125 Pa. 1, 17 At. 204 (18S9). Or it may simply
provide that the executor of a deceased partner leave the decedent's interest in the busi-
ness for a specified period. See Wild v. Davenport, 48 N.J.L. 129, 7 Ad. 295 (18-6);
Sterart v. Robinson, 115 N.Y. 328, 22 N.E. 160 (1839).
Consent may also be given by will of a deceased partner. The will may permit or
direct the executor to continue the estate's investment position in the dissolved partner-
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earnings or taking interest on his fund.3 But when the remaining partners
use his investment without consent, the withdrawing member may be able to
obtain no more than interest. 4 Moreover, when the erstwhile partner or his
personal representative finally decides to withdraw his holdings, creditors of
the business often claim priority over him. If the creditors loaned money
before death or retirement of the firm member, their claims clearly outrank
his.6 And new creditors have precedence if they have not received proper
notice. 7 But when new creditors have notice, priority apparently depends
upon the withdrawing member's having consented to continued use of his
funds.
8
In the recent case of Blut v. Katz,9 the New Jersey Supreme Court inter-
preted Section 42 of the Uniform Partnership Act, which deals with both the
ship's continuing business rather than force a liquidation. See In re Lough, 182 Fed, 961
(2d Cir. 1.910) ; Kilhoffer v. Zeis, 109 Misc. 553, 179 N.Y. Supp. 523 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
Either the will or the partnership agreement may provide for the introduction of a
new partner as a representative of the deceased or retired partner. See Andrews v. Stin-
son, 254 Ill. 111, 98 N.E. 222 (1912) (will) ; Matter of Marx, 106 App. Div. 212, 94 N.Y.
Supp. 151 (2d Dep't 1905) (agreement) ; McGrath v. Cowen, 57 Ohio St. 385, 49 N.E.
338 (1898). This is not the kind of consent here referred to, since in such a situation
the successor partner's undisputed right to share in profits is grounded on ordinary part-
nership principles.
3. See notes 19 and 20 infra. For a complete discussion of the effects of various
arrangements for continuation of a business after the death of a partner, see Fuller, Part-
nership Agreements for Continuation of an Enterprise After the Death of a Partner, 50
YAI.E L.J. 202 (1940). See also Adelman, The Power to Carry on the Business of a
Decedent, 36 Mica. L. REv. 185, 186 (1937).
4. See text at note 16 infra.
5. See page 714 infra.
6. In re Hess, 1 F.2d 342 (W.D. Pa. 1923); Adams & Co. v. Albert, 155 N.Y. 356,
49 N.E. 929 (1898); Kilhoffer v. Zeis, 109 Misc. 555, 179 N.Y. Supp. 523 (Sup. Ct.
1919) ; see Big Four Implement Co. v. Keyser, 99 Kan. 8, 12-13, 161 Pac. 592, 594 (1916).
To hold otherwise would be to allow such a retired or deceased partner to compete with
his own creditors. Section 42 and 41(8) of the Uniform Partnership Act codify this
priority. See note 11 infra.
7. Only legally sufficient -notice to such creditors can terminate the apparent authority
of the remaining partners to act for the old partnership and to thereby bind the retiring
partner or the estate of the deceased partner. See, e.g., Torvend v. Patterson, 136 Cal.
App. 120, 28 P.2d 413 (1933) ; McNeil Co. v. Hamlet, 213 Ill. App. 501 (1919) ; Security
State Bank v. Nelson, 171 Minn. 332, 214 N.W. 51 (1927); Schwartz Bros. & Co. v.
Beacham, 157 Miss. 93, 127 So. 689 (1930); Kersch v. Machover, 194 N.Y. Supp. 239
(Sup. Ct. 1922); UPA § 35; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP 428-42 (1952). At common law, the
general rule is that no special notice is required upon dissolution by death of a partner.
See, e.g., National Union Bank of Maryland v. Hollingsworth, 135 N.C. 556, 47 S.E. 618
(1904). However, § 35 of the Uniform Partnership Act provides that notice of most
types of dissolution, including dissolution by death, must be given directly to those without
actual knowledge who extended credit to the old partnership. New creditors who were
not also creditors of the old partnership may be notified by newspaper publication.
8. See text at notes 27 and 30 infra.
9. 13 N.J. 374, 99 A.2d 785 (1953).
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right of a former partner to share in the profits of a continued business and
his relation to firm creditors.'0 In this case the remaining members of a manu-
facturing enterprise pursued the business without consent of either the de-
ceased partner or his executrix. Section 42 gives a deceased or retired partner
an "ordinary" creditor's right to "the profits attributable to the use of his
right in the property of the dissolved partnership" when the business is con-
tinued with his consent." The Act does not specifically deal with such part-
10. The Uniform Partnership Act has been adopted in the following states: Arkansas,
6 ARx. STATS. AzNN. 8§65-101--65-143 (1947); Colorado, CoLO. STATs. A;: . c. 123,
88 1-43 (1935) ; Delaware, 3 D~l- CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1501-1543 (1953) ; Idaho, 9 ID.,o
CODE §§ 53-301-53-343 (1937) ; Illinois, hI.. ANN. STATs. c. 1061"5, §§ 1-43 (Smith-Hurd,
1952) ; Maryland, 2 ANN. CODE MD. Art. 73A, §§ 1-43 (1951) ; Massachusetts, 3 A-N.
LAWS MfAss. c. 108A, §§ 1-44 (1946); Michigan, 14 Micii. STATS. AN:N. §§ 20.1-20.43
(1937); Minnesota, 21 MINN. STATs. ANN. § 323.01-323A3 (1945); Montana, 4 Rxv.
CODE MONT. §§ 63-101---63-606 (1947); Nebraska, REv. ST.Ts. Nn. §§ 67-301-67-343
(1943); Nevada, NEv. Co-T. LAWS §§5028-502.A3 (Supp. 1931-1941); New Jersey,
T...S.A. §§ 42:1-1---42:1-43 (1940); New Mexico, 5 N.M. STATs. ANN. §§ 70-116-70-
158 (Supp. 1951) ; New York, N.Y. PARTN.RSHip LAYw §§ 1-74 (1948) ; North Carolina,
GEr. STATS. N.C. §§ 59-31-59-73 (1950); Oregon, 1 Om. Rv. STATs. §§ 63.010-63.650
(1953) ; Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1-105 (Purdon, 1930) ; South Dakota,
3 S.D. CODE §§ 49.0101-49.0615 (1939); Tennessee, 5 TENN. CODE A,.:. §§ 7841-732
(Williams, 1934); Utah, 5 UTAH CODE ANN. §§43-1-1--4S-1-40 (1953); Vermont, VT.
STATs. §§ 6062-6105 (1947); Virginia, 7 VA. CODE §§ 50-1-50-43 (1950); Washington,
4 REv. CODE WAsHr. 8§ 25.04-25.08 (1952); Wisconsin, Wis. STArs. §§ 123.01-123.33
(1951) ; Wyoming, Wvo. Comp. STATs. §§ 61-101-61-615 (1945).
11. Section 42 states: "When any partner retires or dies, and the business is con-
tinned under any of the conditions set forth in section 41 (1, 2, 3, 5, 6), or section 38(2b)
without any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate and the person or partner-
ship continuing the business, unless otherwise agreed, he or his legal representative as
against such persons or partnership may have the value of his interest at the date of dis-
solution ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the
value of his interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at his option or the
option of his legal representative, in lieu of interest, the profits attributable to the use of
his right in the property of the dissolved partnership; provided that the creditors of the
dissolved partnership as against the separate creditors, or the representative of the retired
or deceased partner, shall have priority on any claim arising under this section, as pro-
vided by section 41 (8) of this act."
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of § 41 deal with the continuation of a business after assignment
by a retired partner of his interest to one or more of the new firm members. Paragraph
3 refers to such business continuation after consent by the personal representative of a
deceased partner. Paragraph 5 and §38(2b) cover pursuance of the business after a
wrongful dissolution. And paragraph 6 of § 41 deals with continuance of the enterprise
after the expulsion of a partner. It appears that this paragraph refers only to rightful
expulsion, since if the partner were Wrongfully expelled his claim to profits would not
be governed by § 42. It would be measured instead under the original partnership agree-
ment on the theory of a "continuing partnership." Nuland v. Pruyn, 99 Cal. App. 2d 603,
222 P.2d 261 (1950).
Section 41 was designed to insure creditors of the dissolved partnership of also being
creditors of a new business arising from a continuation of the old partnership business
without liquidation of its debts. See UPA § 41, Commissioner's Note. Under common
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ner's rights absent consent. 12 Nevertheless, the executrix argued for a broad
construction of Section 42 in demanding payment of her testator's investment
and a portion of profits earned after his death.13 The New Jersey court rea-
soned that under this section the quid pro quo of a share in profits is the sub-
jection of the retired or deceased partner's interest to the risk of new creditors'
claims. 14 Since the court believed that consenting partners alone assume this
risk,' 5 it granted only the value of the non-consenting partner's investment
plus interest to his executrix.' 6
law there is danger that such creditors might be considered merely personal creditors of
the old partners. However, a promise to pay such old creditors is often implied. See
Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617, 634-6 (1915).
12. Only paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of § 41 deal with retiring or deceased partners, and
consent to continuation is required in these two situations. See note 11 supra.
13. She could have requested interest on the value of her testator's investment, since
§ 42 follows the common law by giving the option of receiving such interest instead of
profits. E.g., Kimball v. Baxter, 67 Cal. App. 635, 228 Pac. 381 (1924) ; In re MeMillan's
Estate, 38 N.M. 347, 33 P.2d 369 (1934) ; Brown's Appeal, 89 Pa. 139 (1879). The pur-
pose of this option is to place the risk of loss upon the partner continuing the business.
See In re Eisenlohr's Estate, 258 Pa. 431, 435, 102 Atl. 115, 116 (1917). Presumably the
enterprise was quite profitable in Blht, and hence a share in profits was more desirable
to the executrix.
14. Blut v. Katz, 13 N.J. 374, 379-80, 99 A.2d 785, 787-8 (1953). An alternative
ground for the decision appears to be the theory that the profits involved were due main-
ly to the "skill, time, and diligence of the remaining partners." Id. at 381, 99 A.2d at 788.
There is some support for this principle. See note 19 infra. However, since no evidence
was introduced indicating otherwise, presumably the profits arose from the sale of hats
manufactured by the partnership. And it is difficult not to conclude that one substantial
source of these profits was the deceased partner's interest in the physical assets of the
partnership. The alternative argument appears even less tenable in view of the court's
decision that the executrix was entitled to a sum representing the decedent's interest in
good will at the time of dissolution. The value of the good will was measured, at least
in part, by the profit-making potential of the business. See id. at 383, 99 A.2d at 789.
Hence it is somewhat inconsistent to conclude that the decedent's interest in good will
did not contribute substantially to the profits earned after dissolution.
15. Id. at 379-80, 99 A.2d at 787-8. One premise of the decision seems to be that
§ 42 is limited to those fact situations enumerated in § 41. See id. at 380, 99 A.2d at 787-8.
Accordingly, the New Jersey court would probably not require consent as a condition
precedent in the case of a partner wrongfully causing a dissolution or a partner right-
fully expelled from a partnership. These cases are covered by paragraphs 5 and 6 of
§ 41, which do not mention consent. See note 1.1 supra. But it is very doubtful that the
interest of such non-consenting partners could be held liable to the claims of new creditors
who had notice of dissolution. Yet they are clearly entitled to share in profits under § 42.
16. The court could have held the claim for profits valid and still have limited its
extent. A large share of the profits could have been allotted to the continuing partners as
"reasonable compensation." See Tucker v. Tucker, 370 Pa. 8, 87 A.2d 650 (1952) (alter-
native holding) ; Bracht v. Connell, 313 Pa. 397, 170 At. 297 (1933). Furthermore, the
right to share in profits could have been confined to the nine months following dissolu-
tion, since at the end of that rperiod the surviving partners, with the consent of the execu-
trix, deposited in court a sum approximately sufficient to cover her claim. At common law
the setting aside of a fund equal to the value of the former partner's interest has been
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This interpretation of Section 42 is both unprecedented and undesirable.1 T
Without a clear legislative mandate,'$ the New Jersey construction discards
the common law doctrine under which a former partner normally receives
profits or interest at his option whether the business is continued with or
without consent.19 All other courts considering Section 42 have construed
held to terminate the right to share in any profits subsequently earned, apparently on the
theory that there can be no unjust enrichment if the property is not used by the surviv-
ing partner. In re Maloney's Estate, 233 Pa. 614, At. 958 (1912). And in construing
§ 42 a court has treated the consent of the claimant to a setting aside of such a sum as
an election by the claimant to take interest rather than profits. Underdovn v Underdom,
279 Pa. 482, 124 AUt. 159 (1924).
17. There are no cases interpreting § 42 which support the "exposure to risk" theory
of Blit, see note 20 infra. And only one common law decision states the principle. See
Taylor v. Hutchinson, 25 Gratt. 536 (Va. 1874). This holding is just as readily ex-
plicable under the unjust enrichment theory, however, since at the date of dissolution the
claimant was indebted to the partnership to such an extent that he had no -aluable part-
nership interest which might be used to earn profits.
18. While there is justification in the language of § 42 for deciding that it was not
meant to apply to non-consent situations, see note 11 supra, there is little justification for
interpolating the word "only" into the section to make it read: "Only [W]hen... the
business is continued under any of the conditions set forth in § 41. . . ." Such an inter-
pretation is in derogation of the well-established common law right to share in profits
in non-consent situations, see note 19 infra, and an interpretation in accord with the com-
mon law is to be preferred unless a contrary construction is compelled by unambiguous
language. See, e.g., Martin v. Federal Surety Co., 53 F2d 79 (8th Cir. 1932) ; Cox v.
St. Anthony Bank & T. Co., 41 Idaho 776, 242 Pac. 785 (1925) ; Palmer v. Sumner, 133
Me. 337, 177 At. 711 (1935).
19. E.g., Ruppe v. Utter, 76 Cal. App. 19, 243 Pac. 715 (1925) (no consent) ; Drap-
kin v. Klebanoff, 5 N.J. Misc. 531, 137 At. 432 (Ch. 1927) (same); Brovn's Appeal, 89
Pa. 139 (1879) (consent); see also Philips v. Reeder, 18 N.J. Eq. 95 (125).
The extent of the former partner's claim to profits is measured by the share of profits
due to utilization of his property. King v. Leighton, 100 N.Y. 3S6, 3 N.E. 594 (1835)
(profits due to completion of contract after dissolution) ; Wood v. Wood, 312 Pa. 374,
167 AUt. 600 (1933). Thus if the profits are due to the skill and effort of the continuing
partner, the former partner may not share in them. Laterra v. Laterra, 134 N.J. Eq. 162,
34 A.2d 289 (1943) (chicken-selling business). And if the former partner had no sub-
stantial interest in partnership assets at the time of dissolution, he vill have no claim to
profits subsequently earned by the continuing partners. Herren v. Harris, 201 Ala. 577,
78 So. 921 (1918) (cotton brokerage business) ; Hall v. Watson, 73 Cal. App. 2d 735,
167 Pd 210 (1946) (former partner in debt to partnership at dissolution); Smith v.
Smith, 51 La. Ann. 72, 24 So. 618 (1S98) (insurance agency). Where this is not the
case, if the business has been continued with consent the continuing partner may claim
a share of the profits as compensation. Littlefield v. Gorton, 65 R.L 390, 14 A.2d 6P2
(1940).
In cases of continuation with consent, there may be an agreement eliminating the
option of taking interest rather than profits and delimiting the former partner's share of
profits. No larger share of profits may then be claimed. In re Mamaux's Estate, 274 Pa.
533, 118 AtL 441 (1922).
Another common law exception denies the former partner's claim to profits or inter-
est if the delay in a settlement of accounts was due to his unreasonable demands. Philips
19541
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it to reach this common law result, 20 which is designed to prevent unjust
enrichment of remaining firm members. 21 Furthermore, denying profits to
non-consenting former partners would enable remaining partners to gain
through a breach of their fiduciary duty to wind up partnership affairs.22
Since partners wrongfully causing dissolution are clearly entitled to profits
under the Act,23 they have, in New Jersey, rights superior to those of a re-
tired partner whose property has been used against his will.
But the interpretation of Section 42 adopted by the other jurisdictions
solves one problem by creating another. While it avoids unjust enrichment,
it will lead to difficulty when liquidation of the continued business engenders
conflict between the claims of former partners and new creditors. Section 42
gives every claimant under it the same status-that of an "ordinary creditor. '24
Accepted principles of statutory interpretation would impart a constant mean-
ing to this term.25 Hence, because Section 42 claimants under the majority
doctrine include both consenting and non-consenting former partners, con-
formity with these principles would result in assigning both classes the same
creditor position as against new creditors. Such a uniform definition would
be inequitable and unprecedented.26
It would be unfair to non-consenting former partners to define "ordinary
creditor" as one on par with or inferior to new firm creditors. There is no
reason for subjecting such a partner's interest to payment of creditors who
had notice of dissolution and therefore had no reason to rely on these assets
to satisfy their claims. The common law avoids this result by making the
v. Reeder, supra (alternative holding, denies profits, grants interest); Randolph v. In-
man, 172 Ill. 575, 50 N.E. 104 (1898) (denies both interest and profits).
And the continuing partner's exercise of a partnership agreement option to purchase
the former partner's interest may cut off the right to share in profits subsequently earned.
Hull v. Cartledge, 18 App. Div. 54, 45 N.Y. Supp. 450 (2d Dep't 1897); Harbster's
Appeal, 125 Pa. 1, 17 Atl. 204 (1889). See note 2 supra.
20. Vanderplow v. Fredricks, 321, Mich. 483, 32 NW.2d 718 (1948) (non-consenting
former partner after dissolution by notice) ; M. & C. Creditors Corp. v. Pratt, 172 Misc.
695, 17 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd withowt opinion, 255 App. Div. 838, 7 N.Y.S.2d
662 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd without opinion, 281 N.Y. 804, 24 N.E.2d 482 (1939) (no con-
sent by personal representative); Spivak v. Bronstein, 367 Pa. 70, 79 A.2d 205 (1951)
(ineffective consent by executrix) ; Bracht v. Connell, 313 Pa. 397, 170 Atl. 297 (1933)
(non-consenting former partner after dissolution by consent); see Moseley v. Moseley,
196 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Cahill v. Haff, 248 N.Y. 377, 380, 162 N.E. 288, 289
(1928).
21. See, e.g., Ruppe v. Utter, 76 Cal. App. 19, 25, 243 Pac. 715, 717 (1925) ; Fleming
v. Fleming, 211 Idaho 1251, 1271-2, 230 N.W. 359, 368 (1930); Losch v. Marcin, 251
N.Y. 402, 410, 167 N.E. 514, 516 (1929) ; King v. Leighton, 100 N.Y. 386, 393, 3 N.E.
594, 597 (1885) ; In re Eisenlohr's Estate, 258 Pa. 431, 437, 102 Ad. 115, 116 (1917).
22. See note 1 supra.
23. UPA §§ 41(5) and 42. See note 11 supra.
24. See note 11 supra.
25. See, e.g., Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp., 316 U.S. 107, 111 (1942); United
States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 547 (1938).
26. See pages 714-15 infra.
[Vol. 63
NOTES
claims of non-consenting retired or deceased partners superior to those of such
creditors2
7
On the other hand, whenever a consenting former partner is involved, it
would be unfair to new business creditors to define "ordinary creditor" as
one superior to them.2 8 The common law with good reason regards a partner
who has assigned his interest to only one of the remaining partners as a per-
sonal creditor inferior to all business creditors, since he was willing to rely
solely upon the individual credit of that firm member.2 And even if the
erstwhile partner assigns his interest to the firm as a whole, an intent to sub-
mit his investment to the risks of the new business may be reasonably
inferred. One line of common law cases adopts this position by making such
consenting former partners inferior to new creditors.30 And, in any event,
no court has gone further than putting consenting partners and new creditors
on par.3 '
Thus both the New Jersey and the majority rules are unsatisfactory, though
for different reasons. The New Jersey decision denies Section 42 "profit-
option" rights to non-consenting former partners but grants them to consent-
ing former partners. Accordingly, only the latter need be termed "ordinary
27. Hurst v. Smith, 227 Ala. 664, 151 So. 825 (1933) ; Giddens v. Reddoch, 207 Ala.
297, 92 So. 848 (1921). Such partners have a lien on partnership property. See Reynolds
v. Roberts, 119 Kan. 281, 237 Pac. 931 (1925) ; Burk v. Burk, 128 S.W. 315 (Ct. App.
Ky. 1910).
28. This definition has already been given the term "ordinary creditor" in a case
involving a claim under § 42 to share in profits made by continuation of the business with-
out consent. Froess v. Froess, 284 Pa. 369, 131 Atl. 276 (1925) ; id., 239 Pa. 69, 137 AtI.
124 (1927). See CRAN.E, PARTNERsHiP 463 nA3 (1952) ; 74 U. oF PA. L. RLv. 512 (1926).
29. The question of the partner's reliance is one of intent to be ascertained from facts
such as the wording of the continuation agreement and the treatment of the debt on the
books of the business. In re Strauss, 9 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1925); Reed v. Dunlop, 20
Fed. 380 (8th Cir. 1922) ; In re Lough, 182 Fed. 961 (2d Cir. 1910) ; In re Hess, 1 F2d
342 (W.D. Pa. 1923). But see Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U.S. 613, 628 (1M0); In re Rudy,
25 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ky. 1939) semble.
30. Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U.S. 613 (180); Big Four Implement Co. v. Keyser, 99
Kan. 8, 161 Pac. 592 (1916) ; Adams & Co. v. Albert, 155 N.Y. 356, 49 N.E. 929 (1893);
Kilhoffer v. Zeis, 109 Misc. 555, 179 N.Y. Supp. 523 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
But the presumption is that a deceased partner did not intend his entire estate to be
subject to the risks of a continued business, even though he consented to its continuation
without liquidation. New creditors, therefore, generally may attack only the value of his
old partnership interest. Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320 (1879); Burwell v. Mandeville's
Ex'r, 2 How. 559 (U.S. 1844) ; Stewart v. Robinson, 115 N.Y. 32, 22 N.E. 160 (1839) ;
Kilhoffer v. Zeis, supra; Wilcox v. Derickson, 168 Pa. 331, 31 AtL 1020 (1895). The
presumption may be rebutted by a clear indication of an intent to subject the entire estate
to claims of new creditors. Accord, Willis v. Sharp, 113 N.Y. 586, 21 N.E. 705 (18M9)
(executor carried on individual proprietorship).
31. It has been held that a former partner's claim will be on par with those of new
creditors if the former partner has not led such creditors to reasonably believe that their
claims could be satisfied from his investment. In re Lough, 182 Fed. 961 (2d Cir. 1910)
(appeared on books as loan upon which interest v-as paid); accord, Smith v. Ayer,
101 U.S. 320 (1879).
1954]
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creditors." Therefore the application of the New Jersey rule would not in-
volve assigning the same creditor position to both consenting and non-con-
senting former partners. However, the New Jersey rule does prevent the
former partner's participation in profits earned by the unauthorized use of his
property. The majority rule avoids this difficulty, but threatens to work in-
justice to either the former partner in non-consent cases or to creditors of the
new business in consent situations, depending upon the definition of "ordinary
creditor" adopted.
32
The disadvantages of both positions can be avoided by applying Section 42
only when the former partner consents to a continuation of the business and
dealing with non-consenting deceased or retired partners under the common
law.33 The clear import of the words of Section 42 suggests this approach.84
Moreover, it appears to have some judicial support.8" While eliminating the
danger of unjust enrichment of the remaining partners, it would at the same
time cope with the creditor problem by placing non-consenting deceased or
retired partners outside the scope of Section 42.80 Thus the term "ordinary
creditor" would refer only to consenting former partners. This would avoid
giving such partners unwarranted preference over new firm creditors.8 7 And
such interpretation of Section 42 would also grant non-consenting partners
their deserved priority under the common law.
32. It might be possible for the Pennsylvania court, which has already interpreted
"ordinary creditor" as meaning one superior to new firm creditors, see note 28 supra, to
avoid difficulty in many future cases involving consenting former partners by holding
them estopped from claiming such advantage. It seems probable that facts amounting to
an estoppel might be present in many such cases. See note 31 mupra.
33. Section 5 of the Uniform Partnership Act provides: "In any case not provided
for in this act the rules of law and equity, including the law merchant, shall govern."
34. See note 11 supra.
It would be possible for a court to interpret "ordinary creditor" as one subordinate to
new creditors if the business was continued with consent, and superior to new creditors
if the business was continued without consent. This, in effect, would be rendering the
term "ordinary" meaningless by robbing it of any fixed definition. See text at note 25
supra.
35. See Sibert v. Shaver, 111 Cal. App. 2d 833, 245 P.2d 514 (1952) ; Losch v. Marcin,
251 N.Y. 402, 167 N.E. 514 (1929). Both cases granted claims of the estates of deceased
partners to a share of the profits made by continuation of a dissolved partnership's business
without consent. Neither case mentions § 42, and yet the Uniform Partnership Act was
in effect in both states. CAL. Civ. CoDE §§ 2395-439 (Deering, 1941) (repealed, 1949);
N.Y. PARTNFmsHn' LAw §§ 1-78 (1948). See also, Blut v. Katz, 13 N.J. 374, 384-5, 99
A.2d 785, 790 (1953) (partial dissent by Chief Justice Vanderbilt and Justice Heher).
36. The English statute avoids the difficulties involved in § 42 by simply codifying
the entire common law doctrine. Thus, there is no limitation of the statute to cases of
continuation with consent and no reference to the creditor status of the former partner.
Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39. See Manley v. Sartori, I Ch. 157 (1927).
37. The resulting inferiority of such partners would be in accord with the intent of
the drafters of the statute. See UPA § 41, Commissioner's Note.
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